Mathematical Monks and the Multiverse

I recently read a truly excellent SF novel by Neal Stephenson entitled Anathem. It's about an alternate universe that has monks whose interests are more on mathematics rather than theology; and they have an alternate philosophical history that parallels the real one. I highly recommend it to pretty much everyone (especially Elliot at CotC if he hasn't already read it).

Part of my motivation for bringing it up is that at one point the monks discuss the Anthropic Principle, and give an excellent account of it:

Paphlagon said, "The cosmogonic processes that lead to the creation of the stuff we are made of -- the creation of protons and other matter, their clumping together to make stars, and the resulting nucleosynthesis -- all seem to depend on the values of certain physical constants. The most familiar example is the speed of light, but there are several others -- about twenty in all. Theors used to spend a lot of time measuring their precise values, back when we were allowed to have the necessary equipment. If these numbers had different values, the cosmos as we know it would not have come into being; it would just be an infinite cloud of cold dark gas or one big black hole or something else quite simple and dull. If you think of these constants of nature as knobs on the control panel of a machine, well, the knobs all have to be set in just the right positions or --"

Again Paphlagon looked to Moyra, who seemed ready: "Suur Demula likened it to a safe with a combination lock, the combination being about twenty numbers long."

"That is right. If you dial twenty numbers at random you never get the safe open; it is nothing more to you than an inert cube of iron. Even if you dial nineteen numbers correctly and get the other one wrong -- nothing. You must get all of them correct. Then the door opens and out spills all of the complexity and beauty of the cosmos."

"Another analogy," Moyra continued, after a sip of water, "was developed by Saunt Conderline, who likened all of the sets of values of those twenty constants that don't produce complexity to an ocean a thousand miles wide and deep. The sets that do, are like an oil sheen, no wider than a leaf, floating on the top of that ocean: an exquisitely thin layer of possibilities that yield solid, stable matter suitable for making universes with living things in them."

However, to get around the theistic repercussions, Anathem appeals to the multiverse hypothesis. Stephenson does this very cleverly: any view that argues that the physical universe isn't all that exists is a sort of multiverse hypothesis. So the Platonic world of forms is positing a multiverse, in which one is a universe of pure forms (in the Anathem alt-history Plato = Protas and Platonist = Protist). Similarly, any theistic explanation of the Anthropic Principle is a multiverse hypothesis, since it holds that there is another world that has some effect in this one. Stephenson's monks conclude from this that, if we have to posit another world in order to account for this one, there can be no reason for limiting the number of other worlds to one.

"It is a legitimate move in metatheorics. You have to be continually asking yourself, 'why are things thus, and not some other way?' And if you apply that test to this diagram, you immediately run into a problem: there are exactly two worlds. Not one, not many, but two. One might draw such a diagram having only one world -- the Arbran Causal Domain -- and zero arrows. That would draw very few objections from metatheoricians (at least, those who are not Protists). One might, on the other hand, assert 'there are lots of worlds' and then set out to make a case for why that is plausible. But to say 'there are two worlds -- and only two!' seems no more supportable than to say 'there are exactly 173 worlds, and all those people who claim that there are only 172 of them are lunatics.'"

Of course, in this post I pointed out that there is a reason for limiting the number of worlds to two: Occam's Razor. The more entities you have to posit, the less likely your theory is correct. The Anthropic Principle shows that we have to posit a world in addition to this one in order to account for the fact that this world has the very specific properties necessary for the existence of life. But unless we have a reason to posit a third or fourth or 173rd world, then to do so simply violates Occam's Razor.

Ironically, part of Anathem's alternate history includes a parallel to Occam's Razor, which is frequently referenced by the characters:

Gardan's Steelyard: A rule of thumb attributed to Fraa Gardan (-1110 to -1063), stating that, when one is comparing two hypotheses, they should be placed on the arms of a metaphorical steelyard (a kind of primitive scale, consisting of an arm free to pivot around a central fulcrum) and preference given to the one that "rises higher," presumably because it weighs less; the upshot being that simpler, more "lightweight" hypotheses are preferable to those that are "heavier," i.e., more complex. Also referred to as Saunt Gardan's Steelyard or simply the Steelyard.

So, basically, the multiverse hypothesis violates the Steelyard: the anthropic coincidences make it absurdly implausible that this world is the only one that exists; but unless it is absurdly implausible that only two worlds exist, it is invalid to think there are more than two. Anathem contains the refutation of one of its premises without realizing it.

However, I'm willing to give Stephenson some grace here, since such an acknowledgment would essentially destroy the premise of the entire book. Now go read it.

(cross-posted at Quodlibeta)

A Circular Argument

James has found a contemporary example of someone promoting the flat-earth myth: that prior to Columbus, people -- particularly Christians -- thought the earth was flat. Of course, pretty much everyone after Aristotle (4th century BC) knew that the earth is round, at least in Europe. Since Christianity was based in Europe from the 1st century AD onwards, it's absurd to claim that Christians or Christianity denied the sphericity of the earth. Admittedly, there were a few examples of flat-earthers, just as there are a few examples today, but nobody took them seriously. This story was used for propaganda purposes in the 19th and 20th centuries, usually by secularists or atheists, to illustrate how foolish and ignorant religion is. The example James found, however, may the beginning of a new trend: someone trying to prop up the accomplishments of medieval Islam by contrasting it with the foolish flat-earth Christians. The author is Jonathan Lyons, and his book is ironically entitled House of Wisdom. It's too bad he doesn't augment his academic reading with Cracked.

The best (well, only) book I've read debunking this silliness is Inventing the Flat Earth: Columbus and Modern Historians by historian Jeffrey Burton Russell. It's an extremely short book, less than 80 pages, but has over 200 detailed endnotes; so you have no excuse for not reading it. Russell points to some disturbingly recent examples of actual historians arguing for the flat earth myth, such as Daniel Boorstin in his book The Discoverers. Russell argues that there were only five Christian writers in late Antiquity who affirmed a flat earth, and none from the Middle Ages.

I fortunately grew up knowing that this storyline that "Columbus proved the earth is round" was bogus, and I thought pretty much everyone else knew it too. I suspected that anyone who seriously thought otherwise essentially got their knowledge on the subject from Bugs Bunny cartoons. ("The Earth is-a round! Like-a my head!" BONK "She's flat like-a your head.") But never underestimate the power of ignorance, particularly among the educated.

Update (28 Feb): Humphrey has two recent posts on the flat-earth myth. This one deals with the Columbus story, and this one deals with Cosmas Indicopleustes, the flat-earther par excellence, who had no influence on either his contemporaries or the Middle Ages. As Russell points out, he wasn't even translated into Latin (and so made accessible to western Europe) until the early 18th century.

1 Corinthians 15:3-8

(This is an essay I wrote for my MA in theology. It should be noted that there is not an original thought in it, and it is significantly dependent on the works of William Lane Craig; many of my references are his, and I just looked them up to make sure he got the quote right.)

In 1 Corinthians 15, the apostle Paul exhorts the fledgling Corinthian church to hold fast "to the gospel which I preached to you, which also you received, in which also you stand, by which also you are saved." He then identifies this gospel with a creed which the vast majority of scholars date to the AD 30s, within about five years of Jesus’ crucifixion. This creed cites that Jesus was killed to atone for our sins, that his corpse was buried, and that he then rose from the dead. He then appeared to various individuals and groups of people. In this essay, I intend to examine this creed by defending its identification as such, the evidence which has convinced most scholars to date it so early, and its content, and the resulting significance for accepting the historical fact of Jesus’ resurrection.

Exegetical evidence for recognizing 1 Cor. 15:3-8 as a creed
"That this confession is an early Christian, pre-Pauline creed is recognized by virtually all critical scholars across a very wide theological spectrum."[1] Some of the reasons given for holding this view are that, first, Paul introduces it as information with which his original audience was already familiar. Second, Paul describes this creed as that which he himself had received (paralambanein) and delivered (paradidonai). These are technical rabbinical terms employed in reference to the passing on of oral tradition.[2] Third, the language is organized stylistically, which is a mnemonic device used in order to facilitate memorization. This is demonstrated by the repetition of phrases such as, "and that" and "according to the Scriptures."[3] Fourth, the language is decidedly non-Pauline, which demonstrates that it probably did not originate with Paul. Non-Pauline phrases include "according to the Scriptures" (kata tas grafas, whereas Paul’s statement to this effect is always kathos gegraptai), as well as "for our sins," "he has been raised," "the third day," "he was seen," etc.[4] Fourth, this passage appears to have been translated into Greek from an Aramaic original, as evidenced by the fact that many of the non-Pauline phrases mentioned above are Semitic in character, as is the parallelism, and the use of Peter’s Aramaic name, Cephas.[5] "These [and other] considerations have persuaded virtually all New Testament scholars that vs. 3-7 do contain a pre-Pauline formula."[6]

The exact content of this creed is a more disputed issue among scholarship. Most would maintain that the creed ends in the middle of verse 6 after the statement that Jesus appeared to the 500 brethren, since the latter half of this verse is typically Pauline, and seems to be a break in the sentence structure. However, there are good exegetical grounds for seeing this, not as the cessation of Paul’s use of the creed, but merely as a parenthetical addition made by Paul, and that the creed continues in verse 7. This is evidenced by the fact that this latter verse contains the statement that Jesus appeared to all of the apostles; but one of Paul’s purposes in 1 Corinthians is to defend his own apostleship (1 Cor. 1:1; 9:1-6). Since verse 8 clearly indicates that he was not present at this appearance, it would serve no purpose for Paul to describe it as having been witnessed by "all the apostles" unless this phrase does not originate with Paul.[7]

Thus the creed would appear to consist of the following statement, minus the parenthetical comments in red font:

(For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received:)
That Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures,
And that he was buried,
And that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures,
And that he appeared to Cephas,
And then to the Twelve,
Then he appeared to more than 500 brethren at one time,
(most of whom remain until now, but some have fallen asleep)
Then he appeared to James
And then to all the apostles.
(Then, as to one untimely born, he appeared to me also.)[8]

The origin and date of the creed
Unfortunately, it would extend this essay beyond reason to discuss why scholars date 1 Corinthians in the mid-AD 50s, as well as why the timeline of Paul’s life detailed in Acts and corroborated in his letters is considered to be fundamentally historically reliable. We must accede to the judgment of the scholarly consensus on these issues in order to set our sights on a more particular target: when did Paul receive this creed? This then lends itself to two more questions: with whom does this creed originate? And when?

Paul’s conversion to Christianity in Damascus is dated at between three to five years after Jesus’ crucifixion, and he visited Jerusalem to confer with the apostle Peter and Jesus’ brother James three years after that (Gal. 1:18-19). The Aramaic character of the creed indicates that it originated when the church was still primarily made up of Jews rather than Gentiles who would have needed it to be in the "trade language" of Greek. Thus, most scholars date Paul’s reception of this creed to within this early period, i.e., three to eight years after the crucifixion.[9]

The particular event which most scholars lean towards is Paul’s visit to Jerusalem three years after his conversion. One of the reasons for dating his reception of the creed to this event is that it would accord well with the prominent place given to Peter and James in the creed, since Paul’s trip to Jerusalem was specifically in order to meet with these two. I don’t find this convincing because it would appear to belie the whole nature of the creed predating Paul; in other words, if Peter and James are mentioned in the creed because Paul met with them at this point, then it would imply that Paul was the one constructing the creed. But we’ve already seen that it’s very unlikely that Paul is the author.

More convincing is the argument of Paul’s description of this trip as historesai. This is another technical rabbinical term used to "designate fact-finding missions to well-known cities and other points of interest with a view toward acquiring first-hand information about them. Accordingly, it implies that Paul’s visit to Cephas and Jerusalem was for the purpose of gaining information about the faith from first-hand witnesses."[10] In fact, we could reasonably conclude this even without any direct exegetical evidence; if Paul traveled to Jerusalem and met with Peter and James there, "we may presume that they did not spend all their time talking about the weather."[11]

Another suggestion is that Paul received this creed immediately after his conversion in Damascus. However, the Aramaisms would suggest that this creed originated in the Jerusalem church, and there may not have been sufficient time for it to have been transferred to the Damascus church during the then-ongoing persecution. Thus, if we must date Paul’s reception of the creed to this early period, Paul’s historesai to Jerusalem, about five to eight years after Jesus’ crucifixion, would appear to be the best candidate, and this is the view that most scholars hold.

This raises the question of who the creed actually comes from. Insofar as Paul received the creed from Peter and James, who are listed therein as having experienced individual appearances of Jesus after his death (not to mention the fact that Peter would have been included in the appearances to the Twelve and to all the apostles), this would constitute eyewitness approval of these statements, if not direct eyewitness statements. Gary Habermas noted this very point in a debate with Antony Flew, that "we have two separate appearances, to the twelve and to the apostles. So that’s in the creed, it’s eyewitness testimony, and it dates back to the time of the Crucifixion."

Most critical theologians who address the issue hold that Paul was given this material by Peter and James in Jerusalem. They were eyewitnesses and both are listed in the creed in 1 Corinthians 15. Now if they gave the creed to Paul, then that is a step earlier than the date of AD 33 to AD 38, which is when Paul received it. If they gave it to him, they knew it even earlier. And then the facts that make up the creed before it is stylized have to be even earlier. So we have three stages, the facts themselves, the disciples’ formulation of it, and Paul’s receiving of it. We do have the eyewitness material here because it was the eyewitnesses, in all likelihood, who gave it to Paul, number one. Second, in 1 Corinthians 15:11, 14, and 15, right after the creed, Paul states that these same eyewitnesses were also proclaiming this message that Jesus was raised. So we do have the eyewitness reports.[12]

It seems to me that we cannot make the claim that the creed was authored or formalized by eyewitnesses to Jesus’ resurrection appearances; however, we can say that it was at least approved of by eyewitnesses. This fact has been recognized by the consensus of scholarship. We are told of this creed that, "This account meets all the demands of historical reliability that could possibly be made of such a text,"[13] and, "The passage therefore preserves uniquely early and verifiable testimony. It meets every reasonable demand of historical reliability."[14] The time needed from the beliefs of the early church to be formulated as a creed and then to Paul’s reception of it brings us back directly to the time of the crucifixion, and thus the beliefs must correspond to the actual events. "No longer can it by charged that there is no demonstrable early, eyewitness testimony for the resurrection ... for this creed provides just such evidential data concerning the facts of the gospel, which are the very center of the Christian faith. It links the events themselves with those who actually participated in time and space."[15]

Content of the creed
In what follows, I will go over the creed line by line, to determine exactly what is being said.

That Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures -- Here we not only have a statement corroborating Jesus’ death, but also an interpretation of it, in which it is seen as an atonement for our sins. This is significant because the early date of the creed doesn’t allow sufficient time for this interpretation to develop from the brute fact of Jesus’ death itself. It might be suggested that this interpretation can be accounted for in the further statement that this is "according to the Scriptures," i.e., that the followers of Jesus found this interpretation in the messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. However, this actually further emphasizes the difficulty: the Jews were not expecting a Messiah who would die, much less one who would do so in order to atone for their sins, but rather a political Messiah who would free them from the yoke of their oppressors (in this case, the Romans); and this expectation is largely based on the Old Testament prophecies about the conquering Messiah. While there are prophecies about an "atoning" Messiah, even John Crossan, one of the more radical scholars, admits that it would take at least five to ten years for the early Christians to interpret Old Testament texts in such a way after Jesus’ death.[16] This is dangerously close to too little time, not to mention the fact that most scholars see Crossan’s view as hopelessly optimistic.[17]

While there are plenty of OT passages which predict that the Messiah would suffer, there aren’t any which state unequivocally that he would die. The fact that the early Christians interpreted these passages as referring to Jesus’ death, then, is extremely significant, especially since the OT passage that the Messiah would not be abandoned to the grave or experience decay (Ps. 16:10) was universally understood as meaning that the Messiah would never die.

And that he was buried -- This importance of this statement lies primarily in what it implies for the one following. In itself, it provides us with a very early belief that Jesus’ corpse was interred.

And that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures -- Here we have what is, quite simply, one of the most significant statements in ancient history. The length of time between the events and the beliefs completely repudiates any attempt to assign belief in Jesus’ resurrection to legendary or mythological development. Moreover, as has already been stated, the ancient Jews simply did not believe in a dying Messiah, much less a rising one. While the resurrection of the dead is a Jewish category of thought, the resurrection of Jesus contradicts it in two central respects: the Jewish belief was in a universal resurrection which took place at the end of time, whereas Jesus’ resurrection was an isolated event which took place within history. This has led most scholars, even Crossan, to admit that there is insufficient material in the Old Testament to interpret in terms of a messianic resurrection.[18] Thus, we are faced with what C. F. D. Moule, a scholar from Oxford University, has called, a belief which nothing, in terms of prior historical influences, can account for -- apart from the resurrection itself.[19]

This statement also affirms that Jesus’ resurrection was "according to the Scriptures." This is probably in reference to the prophecy in Psalm 16:10 that the Messiah would not be abandoned to the grave nor would he see decay. However, as has already been stated, this prophecy in itself is insufficient to account for belief in Jesus’ resurrection, since it was universally believed to mean that the Messiah would never die in the first place.

When tied to the preceding statement, that Jesus’ corpse was buried, the claim that Jesus rose from the dead has great import in that it strongly implies what the gospels state explicitly: his tomb was left empty. In ancient Judaism there was a continuity between the body interred and the body raised. To speak of a resurrection while the body still lay in the tomb was an incoherent concept, and required the passage of nearly two millennia before it would occur to anyone.[20]

Nevertheless, it is frequently held among scholars that, whatever the resurrection was, it had nothing to do with Jesus’ physical body. One of the arguments given for this is that, since Paul clearly views Jesus’ resurrection as the "first fruits" of the general resurrection at the end of the world (1 Cor. 15:20), whatever conclusions he draws about the latter must apply to the former. Thus, when Paul says later in chapter 15 that "it is sown a perishable body, it is raised an imperishable body; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body," (v. 42-44), we are to take this to mean that the resurrection body is being contrasted with our present physical bodies in the sense that the former is not physical in nature. Therefore, it’s not the same body that is interred, and this would then apply to Jesus’ body as well.

I have two responses to this: first, if it is sown a natural body and raised a spiritual body, there is clearly a continuity between the body interred and the body raised. If this means that the physical body is transformed into a non-physical body, so be it; but this can’t be used to maintain that the resurrection body has nothing in common with our earthly, physical bodies. Second, in this very same letter, Paul uses exactly the same vocabulary to contrast the natural man with the spiritual man (1 Cor. 2:14-15); but here the contrast is clearly between a man under the domination of sinful human nature and the man who has submitted himself to God’s Holy Spirit. In other words, it’s a contrast in orientation, not of substance or materiality.[21] One of the central tenets of exegesis is to interpret the unclear in light of the clear. Thus, we should interpret Paul’s statements in chapter 15 in light of his statements in chapter 2: the resurrection body is a real, tangible, physical body that is no longer under the control of sin and corruption and mortality. Similarly, when Paul states that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable," (1 Cor. 15:50), we need to recognize that the phrase "flesh and blood" is an idiom which Paul uses in reference to sinful human nature (Gal. 1:16; Eph. 6:12), and should not be understood as stating that the resurrection body will be a non-physical entity. Likewise, by saying that the perishable won’t inherit the imperishable, he’s simply saying that our resurrection bodies won’t be prone to death and corruption like our earthly bodies are.

And that he appeared to Cephas -- "Cephas" is the Aramaic name for Peter. The only other account we have of this appearance is in Luke 24:34, but no details are given.

And then to the Twelve -- This is a name given to the original twelve apostles which Jesus chose. At first, there would seem to be a problem, since Judas Iscariot had already committed suicide by the time of this appearance, and Matthias had not replaced him yet. However, when choosing a replacement, it was specifically required that he be someone who had "been with us the whole time the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from John's baptism to the time when Jesus was taken up from us" (Acts 1:21). So the Twelve were not alone when Jesus appeared to them; there were others present as well, who had been with the apostles "the whole time." An apostle was anyone who had witnessed the entirety of Jesus’ ministry. It was from this pool of people that Judas’ successor was chosen.

Historically, the appearance to the Twelve is one of the best attested appearances of Jesus. "We have independent narratives of this event in Luke and in John. Both of them locate it in the upper room in Jerusalem. Then you have it attested by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15. So the appearance to the Twelve, it seems to me, is very well attested -- even the location of it, which I regard as a secondary detail and not so important."[22] Among critical NT scholars, multiple, independent attestation of a historical event is one of the key criterion for establishing authenticity. That is precisely what we have here. Very few events in ancient history have as much evidence in their favor as Jesus’ resurrection appearance to the Twelve.

Then he appeared to more than 500 brethren at one time -- This statement hits us like a ton of bricks. Jesus appeared to over 500 people at one time. Just in case there was any doubt that an appearance to over twelve people rules out the possibility of hallucination, we are given an example that outdoes this fifty-fold. This appearance completely repudiates any attempt to deny Jesus’ resurrection.

Because of this, the only option open to detractors of Christianity is to deny the historicity of this appearance. It has been suggested, for example, that since there aren’t any explicit references to this appearance in the gospels (although Jesus’ appearance on the Galilean hillside in Matt. 28:16-20 has been suggested), this event didn’t happen.[23] The reasoning behind this objection seems bizarre, though: since an event isn’t corroborated in our later sources, but is only mentioned in our earliest and most reliable source, we should presume it didn’t happen? Are we really supposed to take this seriously?

(most of whom remain until now, but some have fallen asleep) -- This is an interpolation by the apostle Paul. While it’s not a part of the creed itself, and thus can only be dated to the time when 1 Corinthians was written in the mid-AD 50s, this statement further compounds our amazement at the claim that Jesus appeared to 500 people at one time -- Paul tells his original audience that most of these people are still alive to be questioned! Most scholars recognize that Paul is essentially challenging his readers to verify that this event occurred by checking with the people who experienced it.

Then he appeared to James -- While there are several people named James in the NT, even radical scholars concede that this refers to Jesus’ brother James.[24] During Jesus’ life, his family did not support him or his actions (Mark 3:30-5; John 7:1-5), but not long after his crucifixion we suddenly find his mother and brothers worshipping him along with the apostles (Acts 1:14). Flavius Josephus reports in about AD 93 that he was eventually stoned to death for his belief that his brother was Israel’s Messiah and had risen from the dead.[25] The inexplicability of James’ conversion has eluded all attempts of explanation -- unless his brother really did rise from the dead, and James saw him.

And then to all the apostles -- This is probably not referring to the Twelve, since they’ve already been mentioned in the creed by a different name, but to the larger group of those who had witnessed Jesus’ entire ministry. It’s unknown how many people this referred to. Perhaps this is the group of seventy that Jesus appointed and sent out to the Galilean countryside (Luke 10:1), but this is just speculation.

(Then, as to one untimely born, he appeared to me also.) -- This is an addendum to the creed made by Paul which relates that he experienced an appearance of Jesus as well. It has been argued by some that, since Paul’s experience as related in the book of Acts was not a physical apparition, and since he is here putting it on the same level as the other resurrection appearances of Jesus, that all of these appearances should be regarded as non-physical in nature (this is obviously another argument that Jesus’ resurrection didn’t have anything to do with his corpse).[26] My response to this is, first, even a scholar as radical as Crossan admits that, "Paul needs in 1 Cor. 15 to equate his own experience with that of the preceding apostles. To equate, that is, its validity and legitimacy, but not necessarily its mode or manner. ... Paul’s own entranced revelation should not be ... the model for all the others."[27] As has already been mentioned, one of Paul’s main goals in writing 1 Corinthians is to defend his own apostleship. Thus, he includes his experience with the others, not to relate theirs to his but to relate his to theirs.

Second, it is simply false to say that the several accounts of Paul’s experience in Acts relate it as non-physical. While it certainly differs from the other resurrection appearances in that it’s description seems to be more of a "heavenly vision," the people with Paul saw a light and heard a voice, but they were not able to understand what was being said (Acts 9:3-8; 22:6-11; 26:12-18). So Paul’s experience was not something that happened "only to him," but was witnessed by several other people as well.

The significance of this statement by itself is that Paul is describing to us an appearance he personally experienced of the risen Jesus, one that was witnessed (but not comprehended) by others. This experience convinced him to join the fledgling church he had hitherto persecuted.

He was a rabbi, a Pharisee, a respected Jewish leader. He hated the Christian heresy and did everything in his power to stamp it out. He was even responsible for the execution of Christian believers. Then suddenly he gave up everything. He left his position as a respected Jewish leader and became a Christian missionary: he entered a life of poverty, labor, and suffering. He was whipped, beaten, stoned and left for dead, shipwrecked three times, in constant danger, deprivation, and anxiety. Finally, he made the ultimate sacrifice and was martyred for his faith at Rome. And it was all because on that day outside Damascus, he saw "Jesus our Lord."[28]

Conclusion
R. T. France, a NT scholar from Oxford, states that

Ancient historians have sometimes commented that the degree of scepticism with which New Testament scholars approach their sources is far greater than would be thought justified in any other branch of ancient history. Indeed many ancient historians would count themselves fortunate to have four such responsible accounts, written within a generation or two of the events, and preserved in such a wealth of early manuscript evidence as to be, from the point of view of textual criticism, virtually uncontested in all but detail. Beyond that point, the decision as to how far a scholar is willing to accept the record they offer is likely to be influenced more by his openness to a ‘supernaturalist’ world-view than by strictly historical considerations.[29]

I have appealed throughout this essay to the consensus of scholarship. It needs to be pointed out here that very few of these scholars believe that Jesus really did rise from the dead. Most of them come to the table with the presupposition that miracles can’t happen, not to mention their overly skeptical stance of their sources. And yet, with all of this, they have found themselves compelled by the nature of the evidence to acknowledge that 1 Corinthians 15:3ff relates an ancient creed that dates back to immediately after the events it purports to relate. Moreover, they freely admit that they are completely impotent to explain the historical evidence without recourse to Jesus’ resurrection from the dead.[30] Their unwillingness to accept this, therefore, is not based on any lack of historical evidence, but rather on their belief that such things couldn’t really happen. This strikes me as an intellectually irresponsible concession to the spirit of the age; in fact, it seems to be a view held by blind faith. They should be reminded that, "Any interpretation of reality not in accord with the facts about reality is just a fairy tale which no rational person should believe."[31]

Notes:

[1] Gary R. Habermas, The Historical Jesus (Joplin, MO: College Press, 1996), 153.
[2] Joachim Jeremias, Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu, 4th ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), 95-8; cited in William Lane Craig, Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mullen, 1989), 2-3. Specifically, Jeremias claims that paralambanein and paradidonai correspond to the Hebrew phrases qaval min and masar qa respectively. The significance of this is that oral tradition was memorized and passed on in a word-for-word fashion.
[3] Jeremias, The Eucharistic Words of Jesus (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1966), 102-3.
[4] Ibid., 101.
[5] Ibid., 102-3.
[6] Craig, Assessing the NT Evidence, 3.
[7] Peter Stuhlmacher, Das paulinische Evangelilum, FRLANT 95 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 268-9; cited in Craig, Assessing the NT Evidence, 5-6.
[8] Personal translation.
[9] Habermas, Historical Jesus, 154.
[10] Craig, Assessing the NT Evidence, 17.
[11] C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments, 3rd ed. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1967), 26.
[12] Gary R. Habermas and Antony G. N. Flew, Did Jesus Rise From the Dead?: The Resurrection Debate, Terry L. Miethe, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 54, 83.
[13] Hans von Campenhausen, "The Events of Easter and the Empty Tomb," in Tradition and Life in the Church (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968), 44.
[14] Archibald M. Hunter, Jesus, 100. Quoted in Habermas, Historical Jesus, 156.
[15] Habermas, Historical Jesus, 157.
[16] John Dominic Crossan, Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography (San Francisco: Harper, 1994), 145.
[17] See several quotes given in William Lane Craig, "Opening Address," in Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up?: A Debate Between William Lane Craig and John Dominic Crossan, Paul Copan, ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 31.
[18] John Dominic Crossan, Four Other Gospels (Minneapolis: Winston, 1985), 174.
[19] C. F. D. Moule, The Phenomenon of the New Testament, Studies in Biblical Theology, 2nd series, no. 1 (Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson, 1967), 3, 13.
[20] Raymond E. Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus (New York: Paulist, 1973), 70, n. 121.
[21] See Craig’s excellent discussion of this in Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up?, 51-2.
[22] Craig, in Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up?, 55.
[23] Michael Martin, The Case Against Christianity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 90. Martin is not a NT scholar.
[24] Helmut Koester, Introduction to the New Testament, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 73.
[25] Josephus, Antiquities 20:200.
[26] Gerd Lüdemann, "Second Rebuttal" in Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment?: A Debate Between William Lane Craig and Gerd Lüdemann, Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli, eds. (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 60-1.
[27] Crossan, Jesus, 169.
[28] William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 1994), 283.
[29] R. T. France, "The Gospels as Historical Sources for Jesus, the Founder of Christianity," in Truth 1 (1985): 86.
[30] Craig, Reasonable Faith, 280.
[31] Craig, Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up?, 32.

Sorry

I've really been slacking on my blog posting lately. My apologies, I'll step up to the plate and start being more consistent.

Ouch

An old Russian satellite and a commercial American satellite have collided several hundred miles over Siberia. Now there are hundreds of smaller, non-fuctional satellites cluttering up the exosphere.

The Anthropic Principle for Misanthropes, part 4

In this series I have left out a lot regarding the Anthropic Principle, because my focus is on its value as a teleological argument for the existence of God. So, for example, I have not gone over the several types of APs that have been proposed, i.e. the Weak (WAP), Strong (SAP), Participatory (PAP), and Final (FAP) -- the latter of which Martin Gardner cleverly called the Completely Ridiculous Anthropic Principle (CRAP).

Some people think that any teleological argument is invalid in light of Darwin. Such arguments are automatically excluded from consideration, since they also apply to arguments against biological evolution. If some teleological arguments from a particular field are invalid, why doesn't that give us grounds for rejecting those from other fields? My answer is fairly simple: because the arguments against evolution don't work and the arguments from the AP do. It doesn't matter who is presenting the argument or what their motivation is: if it's valid, it's valid; and if it's invalid, it's invalid.

One thing that frustrated me about the AP when I first studied it, however, is that there seem to be examples of fine-tuning that don't serve any purpose. The example that particularly hit home with me was that our location with regards to the sun and the moon make it appear as if they just happen to be the same size in the sky. The AP shows that we have to have a moon a particular size and distance from us, and the earth has to be a particular distance from a particular kind of star during a particular burning phase; but it just seems weird to me that this results in the sun and moon appearing to be the same size in the sky. If someone rigged the game, it looks like they were rigging it to mislead us into thinking that they were the same size. Of course, the ancients were able to study the sun and the moon and determine that they're not even remotely close in terms of size. But it seems like a meaningless coincidence, and this made me suspicious that the examples of alleged fine-tuning that the AP demonstrates were similarly coincidental.

The resolution to this leads to a very interesting corollary to the AP. The surface of the earth is the only place in the solar system where an observer could see a total eclipse, in which one body blocks out the sun, but does so just barely, so that the sun's corona can be observed. For millennia, solar eclipses were one of the primary methods by which humankind could study the sun. Such study would only be possible if the sun and the moon appeared to be the same size in the sky. So the same characteristics that make life possible are also the characteristics that allow us to study and investigate the universe around us.

With the advent of the Mars Rovers, there has been a boon in the last several years on Mars studies. Below, on the left, is a series of pictures taken by one of the Rovers of Phobos, one of Mars' moons, crossing between Mars and the sun. The picture on the right is of Mars' other moon Deimos doing the same. Click here to see a very short video (a couple of seconds long) of it.



The point in showing these is that such "eclipses" (they're actually called transits or occultations) would not allow any observers to study the sun's corona.

Here's another example: the AP says that in order for life to be possible, the solar system must reside in a spiral galaxy, and lie in-between spiral arms. In the same way, we have to be between spiral arms in order to see anything beyond our own galaxy. In any other location in any other type of galaxy, the number of nearby stars and the light they produce would prevent us from seeing very far beyond them. So just as it looks like the universe and Earth have been arranged in order to support life, it looks like the universe and Earth have been arranged in order to allow for scientific discovery. Praise God.

(see also part 1, part 2, and part 3)

(cross-posted at Quodlibeta)

The Last Allowed Prejudice

Actually there's two: this and people with southern accents.

Thought of the Day

"Give a man a fish and he eats for a day. Teach a man to fish and he eats for a lifetime."
Ummm...why can't we do both?

Web Resources

This category of links on the sidebar take you to non-blog websites which I think are excellent (spoiler!) resources. Many of them provide quick access to very important writings.

The first is Bible Gateway. This site's value lay primarily in that it contains numerous translations of the Bible, including 20 in English, combined with a search engine to find words, phrases, subjects, or particular verses.

The Catholic Encyclopedia is next. This is an incredibly extensive collection of articles on church history, theology, and all things Catholic. It's excellent, although most of it was written pre-Vatican 2, which means it doesn't have an inclusive view towards Protestantism. But it's still an excellent resource, and highly recommended.

Next is the Christian Classics Ethereal Library. This is a collection of multiple writings from Christian history, including works of theology, spirituality, philosophy, commentaries, and on it goes. They're constantly adding new texts. Some of it, like the writings of the Church Fathers, is available elsewhere, such as the Catholic Encyclopedia. But CCEL is the best one-stop shop for Christian writings through the ages.

I added Early Modern Philosophy to the list a few months ago. It's fairly limited, focusing on a handful of the most important authors and texts, but it's still helpful. Run by the philosopher Jonathan Bennett.

EpistemeLinks is a linkwell to philosophy sites. It's not a collection of writings itself, but links to other sites that focus on particular authors or subjects, including texts of many works throughout philosophical history. Very valuable.

Internet Classics Archive does the same thing as CCEL, but instead of collecting specifically Christian writings it collects the writings of ancient authors, whether they be plays, poetry, political commentary, history, philosophy, or theology. Also very valuable.

Islamic Philosophy Online collects many of the most important writings of Muslim philosophers and commentary on them, as well as contemporary writings (like this one). If you look up particular Muslim philosophers on EpistemeLinks, many of the links go to this site. Islamic philosophy is something of particular interest to me, and it doesn't seem to me to get the attention it deserves in the West, to our detriment.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is an excellent collection of in-depth articles on philosophical topics. It's an ongoing project, which means there are plenty of gaps where important topics do not yet have their own entry. But it's incredibly extensive on the subjects it addresses, and worth spending a lot of time on.

Finally, I'm including Wikipedia (that's English; it's available in many other languages as well) because it's the most extensive online encyclopedia of everything. Often, I'll link to it on a general subject, even though it has pretty daunting weaknesses. In my experience it's reliable, although when the subject is politics, the people who write the entries are constantly trying to "silence" their opponents. Other than that, though, it's helpful.

Update (3 Sep 2009): I've added a few more links; see here.

An Interesting Reaction

One theistic argument is the moral argument (or axiological argument). It's the idea that in order to say that there are actual moral rights and wrongs, we have to presuppose a sort of metaphysical anchor or ground for these values that transcends individual cultures and epochs, something in fact which looks very much like the Judeo-Christian God. If we reject such a ground, then we are left with pure relativism, where nothing is actually right or wrong. This may be OK when the issue under discussion is whether you should be completely forthcoming on your taxes, but when we point to horrific atrocities, it becomes very difficult to say that there is simply nothing morally wrong going on.

However, rather than defend this argument, I want to point to an interesting reaction to it. Many atheists who hear the moral argument misunderstand it to mean that atheists cannot be moral people or upstanding citizens. If you need to believe in God in order to believe that rape is wrong, then you're essentially arguing that if you don't believe in God, then you must not believe that rape is really wrong. But of course, this isn't the argument. The point, rather, is that the moral judgment "rape is wrong" -- made by theist and atheist alike -- must have a metaphysical ground in order to be valid. Thus, according to the moral argument, the atheist is being inconsistent in affirming that rape is wrong while denying that God exists. But this does not mean that atheists don't know right from wrong.

Now part of the reason I find this reaction interesting is that I could present a parallel argument which almost certainly would not provoke the same reaction. Say, for example, I argued that in order for mathematics to be possible we have to posit a metaphysical foundation for numbers, a Platonic realm of forms, which is best understood as the mind of God (such arguments have been made). So in order to affirm that 2 + 2 = 4, we have to presuppose something like the Judeo-Christian God. How many people would misunderstand such an argument to mean that if you don't believe in God, you don't really believe that 2 + 2 = 4? I suspect very few, if any. Yet this argument is exactly parallel to the moral argument: in order to affirm X we have to presuppose a metaphysical foundation for it that is best understood as God.

So why are some people so liable to misunderstand the moral argument? Again, I suspect (although I could very easily be wrong) it's because our views on morality are inextricably bound up with our views of ourselves: what we do and what we think should be done says a great deal of what kind of person we are. So when someone tells an atheist that her worldview is inconsistent with believing that rape is wrong, she reacts. Instead of realizing that the moral argument is saying something about the relationship between her worldview and moral beliefs, she only sees it as saying something about her moral beliefs, and thus about herself: whether she is a good person.

(cross-posted at Quodlibeta)

Quote of the Day

...if we had no call to question the truth of scientific principles except in the interest of maintaining that of conflicting ethical principles, I think many would be inclined to drop the latter -- to treat moral distinctions as pointing to nothing real beyond modes of feeling and believing which arise under certain conditions in men's minds. There is, they might say, no knowledge of good and evil, right and wrong, because nothing that happens really is any of these. There is only a discoverable connexion of events really happening and producing consequences, with feelings of pain and pleasure and the use of certain words, including words such as 'approval' and 'disapproval', to signify these feelings and their connexion with what produces them. Not every one would be satisfied with this account; some, with the best consideration that they could give to the question, would say that this was not what they meant when they said of anything that it was good or evil, right or wrong, that men ought or ought not to do certain actions; that in so speaking they recognized something for which if an account of the real left no room, it could not be correct. But others would dissent, and that without self-contradiction.

If, however, the principles underlying the scientific account of what the world really is, and how what really happens in it is related to what passes in the minds of men, were as little consistent with maintaining the distinction of truth from error as with maintaining that of good from evil or of right from wrong, then however shattering to the sufficiency of this account may be the denial that these principles are altogether true, I see no alternative to denying it. For the scientific account, though not claiming to be good or right, claims to be true; and it cannot reasonably do this, and abolish the possibility of knowledge.

Yet surely it does abolish this possibility. In the extreme instance of a Behaviourist account of the mind, that seems obvious; for if thought is laryngeal motion, how should any one think more truly than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but they cannot be discriminated as true and false. It seems as nonsensical to call a movement true a a flavour purple or sound avaricious. But what is obvious when thought is said to be a certain bodily movement seems equally to follow from its being the effect of one. Thought called knowledge and thought called error are both necessary results of states of brain. These states are necessary results of other bodily states. All the bodily states are equally real, and so are the different thoughts; but by what right can I hold that my thought is knowledge of what is real in bodies? For to hold so is but another thought, an effect of real bodily movements like the rest. An intelligence not determined by what falls within this bodily system to which belong the conditions producing our thoughts might, if it were capable of knowing both the events in that system and the thoughts of it which these determine, discover under what conditions bodily events within the system produce thoughts of it agreeing with what this extraneous intelligence knows it to be, and under what conditions not. But the thought determined by these conditions could not know what the extraneous intelligence knew without being itself also extraneous to the system within which, nevertheless, the conditions determining it are supposed to lie. These arguments, however, of mine, if the principles of scientific theory are to stand unchallenged, are themselves no more than happenings in a mind, results of bodily movements; that you or I think them sound, or think them unsound, is but another such happening; that we think them no more than another such happening is itself but yet another such. And it may be said of any ground on which we may attempt to stand as true, Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.

That the principles, then, on which rests the scientific theory of the world are absolutely true is not only inconsistent with ethical theory; it is inconsistent with there being knowledge, or even true opinion. And therefore with themselves; for they claim to be matter of knowledge, or at least of true opinion. Since that is so, we are not required to make our ethical theory consistent at all points with the scientific account of the world; if our ethical theory is to be true, it must not be built upon the principles of the scientific account, or require their unquestioned acceptance. And this result, if correct, is of importance, and illustrates the necessity to Ethics of a metaphysical foundation.

H. W. B. Joseph
Some Problems in Ethics

Ha!

OK, now imagine instead of a political debate, it's a religious debate; between an atheist and a Christian. And now imagine that instead of saying "9/11" the atheist says "evolution."

Of course, this would entail that the undecided voters are agnostics. But I have a higher view of agnostics than that.

The Anthropic Principle for Misanthropes, part 3

In part 1 I explained what the Anthropic Principle is: in order for life to exist anywhere in the universe at any time in its history, multiple conditions must be met which make it virtually impossible that the universe would be hospitable to life if left to its own resources. Since the universe is hospitable to life, it follows that it was not left to its own resources: Something that exists independently of the universe made it so that it would be able to support life. In part 2, I dealt with several objections to this monotheistic conclusion. In this post I'm going to take a look at two more objections to it. I saved these two for their own post because they require a fuller response than the others.

1. "Maybe there are an infinite number of universes and this just happens to be the one with all the necessary conditions for life." This is known as the multiverse hypothesis (also called the "many worlds" or "world ensemble" hypothesis; Humphrey's been blogging on it lately), and it has some gynormous problems. The first is that it violates Occam's Razor. This is the idea that the simpler explanation is more likely to be the correct one. Often, atheists misunderstand this to mean that a qualitatively simpler explanation is preferable, and then argue that an omniscient and omnipotent God would be the most complex explanation imaginable. Unfortunately, at least for their case, there are two difficulties with such an understanding. First, it just flies in the face of the doctrine of divine simplicity. This is the view that God is the least complex entity in existence, and was held by most of the Christian theologians and philosophers in history, although it's fallen on hard times recently. But even if we ignore that, this argument completely misunderstands what is meant by simplicity. It's not that the cause of an effect must be understood as ontologically simple; it's that it must be numerically simple: the more entities you have to posit, the less likely your theory is correct. In other words, Occam's Razor is the claim that the quantitatively, not qualitatively, simpler explanation is more likely to be true.

To apply it to the case in point, the multiverse hypothesis has to posit an unfathomable or infinite number of universes in order to account for one universe having the necessary conditions for life. By contrast, Monotheism posits the existence of one causal agent who brought the universe into existence with the necessary conditions. Obviously, the latter is the simpler explanation, and so according to Occam's Razor, we should prefer it to the multiverse hypothesis.

The second problem with the multiverse is as follows: if you watched someone flip a coin a million times and it came up heads each time, you could either conclude that it's fixed in some way (maybe it's a two-headed coin) or you could conclude that there are an infinite number of coins being flipped and you just happened to see the one that came up with a million heads in a row. The gambler takes the chance on the latter and so bets that the coin is due to come up tails on the next flip. But 1) even if it is an honest coin, it only ever has a 50-50 chance of coming up tails at any particular flip. It isn't "due." This is the gambler's fallacy. The multiverse hypothesis, however, does not commit the gambler's fallacy, it commits 2) the inverse gambler's fallacy. Basically, regardless of whether the gambler was right to think the coin is due to come up tails, his assumption that it's an honest coin would only be valid if he actually saw all the other infinite number of coins coming up with all their different results. When you have a sample of one, it is much more rational to conclude that the game is fixed. (This, incidentally, is a further response to the third objection in part 2, that we cannot draw any conclusions about probability because we only have the one universe to work with.) So the fact that we have a universe that appears rigged is best explained by the hypothesis that it is, in fact, rigged. The universe is the way it is because someone decided it should be.

Third, no one has been able to come up with a multiverse that does not itself have a beginning as well as numerous anthropic coincidences of its own. So it doesn't evade the question of why the universe can support life; it just forces us to ask it again with slightly different terminology.

Fourth, the supposition of other universes by itself does not evidently lead to a solution of the Anthropic Principle. As William Lane Craig writes,

even if we conceded that a multiple universe scenario is unobjectionable, would such a move succeed in rescuing us from teleology and a cosmic Designer? This is not at all obvious. The fundamental assumption behind the Anthropic philosopher's reasoning in this regard seems to be something along the lines of

8. If the Universe contains an exhaustively random and infinite number of universes, then anything that can occur with non-vanishing probability will occur somewhere.

But why should we think that the number of universes is actually infinite? This is by no means inevitable, not to mention the paradoxical nature of the existence of an actually infinite number of things. And why should we think that the multiple universes are exhaustively random? Again, this is not a necessary condition of many-worlds hypotheses. In order to elude the teleological argument, we are being asked to assume much more than the mere existence of multiple universes.

Finally, the multiverse hypothesis is just as metaphysical as the monothestic hypothesis. For those who don't like metaphysics in their science, the multiverse is no better than saying "God did it." So it's not a choice between one theory that's metaphysical and one that's not (or perhaps one that's less so); it's a choice between two equally metaphysical solutions, one of which commits fallacies and one which does not.

2. "These characteristics are just for life as we know it." Another way of stating this objection is that life accommodates itself to its surroundings. Observing how the universe just happens to meet the necessary criteria for life is like a puddle observing how the pot hole just happens to be shaped for the puddle to fit in it.

So let's clarify our terms. When we refer to life in this context we mean physical life, life that is composed of matter, i.e. atoms. Moreover, in order for something to be physically alive it must be capable of processing physical energy to perform work; when a living thing stops processing energy we call it death. Now of course, one may simply say that there may be non-physical life out there. Certainly. In fact, most religions maintain that there are entities that are not physical. They're called angels. Or one could say that non-living material entities are alive in some sense; perhaps each rock is conscious for example. But this would merely be ascribing an occult property (rather than a physical property) called "life" to physical objects; as such it would also be a form of non-physical life. And if one is willing to accept the existence of a non-physical realm in order to explain the Anthropic Principle, there can be no objection to the monotheistic explanation of it. In order to avoid such an explanation, therefore, this objection must say that the Anthropic Principle only applies to physical life as we know it.

In order for a physical entity to process energy, it must have complex molecules which are physically capable of such processes. Complex molecules are those that are based on atoms that are able to form a large number of bonds with other atoms. There are only three elements capable of forming complex molecules: silicon, boron and carbon. Silicon can only form about a hundred amino acids, which is insufficient for physical life. Boron is rare, and poisonous to life where it does exist in concentration; plus, wherever boron exists, carbon exists in much greater abundance, so it's not very likely to happen. Thus, when we discuss the necessary parameters for life, we refer to carbon-based life. One might think if the laws of nature were different it would change the situation. True. The Anthropic Principle shows that if the laws of nature were different, physical life could not exist at all.

Now some might suggest that I'm simply not taking the concept of "life as we know it" far enough. I'm still working in terms of atoms, and perhaps if we look into the subatomic realm, we would find ways for different types of atoms to form into different types of molecules that could then form living creatures. The problem here is that the ability of atoms to form bonds is directly related to the configuration and properties of its electrons. So the capacity for something to be alive in a physical sense is based on the basic properties of atoms, and thus of matter. Now the question arises: would it be possible to alter the basic properties of electrons or other subatomic particles in such a way that they would still be able to form into complex molecules capable of processing energy to perform work? To the best of my knowledge, the answer is no. The properties of electrons, protons, and neutrons as well as their interaction are some of the most dramatic examples of anthropic coincidences. Their masses must be precisely what they are, their decay processes must be precisely what they are, their ratios to each other must be precisely what they are, etc. in order for life to exist. For example, the ratio of electrons to protons that were created in the Big Bang must be exactly the same number to within one part in 10³⁷ in order for their charges to balance out. Otherwise, the electromagnetic force would have dominated gravity and prevented the formation of planets, stars, and galaxies.

One might still object, though, that if completely different subatomic particles were created in the Big Bang which then formed completely different atoms and molecules, it would be possible to have a different type of life. But as soon as we're positing a completely different type of matter, it becomes difficult to continue calling it matter. In other words, this would (again) be just as metaphysical a solution as the monotheistic one. Moreover, at this point, we're positing different universes in order to explain the Anthropic Principle, so for this suggestion to have any force it must be wedded to the multiverse hypothesis with all of its failings. Thus, the monotheistic solution to the Anthropic Principle is preferable.

There's one more installment to go. Stay tuned.

Update (13 Feb): See also part 1, part 2, and part 4.

(cross-posted at Quodlibeta)

I'm looking over an old Mars Rover...

The two Mars Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, were designed to last three months. They just hit five years and they're still going. They're like the Energizer Bunny of space.

Year in review(s)

I think blogs are at their best when they act as watchdogs over the mainstream media. Patterico is an excellent example. He devotes much of his blog to criticism of the Los Angeles Times, and then summarizes it all with one big post at the end of the year. Here's his extensive summary for 2008.

However, it is primarily a political critique from the right side of the political spectrum. If you're in the mood for something a little more lighthearted, just read Dave Barry's prospective look at 2008.

Update (11 Jan): Retro. Retrospective look at 2008. Arrrgh!