Many cosmological arguments, though not all, argue that the universe began to exist; and since everything that began to exist was caused by something else, the universe was caused by something else. With Big Bang cosmology this point has received empirical confirmation: according to the Big Bang, the universe -- that is, matter, energy, space, and time -- began to exist. Thus, something that exists independently of matter, energy, space, and time brought them into existence.
One objection to such arguments is that, even if the Big Bang has a cause, there's no reason to think this cause is God, much less the God of the Bible. I have to admit, I've never felt the force of this objection. I mean, is there any other issue where if you don't prove everything about it with a single argument, you prove nothing about it? The Big Bang only proves that there is an immaterial, spaceless (hence omnipresent and transcendent), timeless, and unimaginably powerful cause of the universe, and the response is, "Yeah, so?" Really? Of course the Big Bang doesn't prove that the cause of the universe is the ground of morality, of course it doesn't prove that Jesus rose from the dead, etc. But has anyone ever claimed it does? Why can't it function as part of a cumulative case argument?
What this objection is really focusing on, I think, is whether the cause of the universe is a mind -- or at least, as C. S. Lewis puts it, "more like a mind than it is like anything else we know". A cause that was not a mind would be mechanistic, since a mechanistic cause is one which produces its effect automatically. That is, if the cause is present, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effect to take place are met; and since the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effect to take place are met, the effect takes place.
But since the scientific evidence proves that we are dealing with the beginning of time itself, the cause of the universe must be timeless. So is it possible to have a timeless mechanistic cause that produces a temporal effect (in this case, the universe)? It is difficult to see how this would be possible. A timeless mechanistic cause would produce its effect timelessly, since the necessary and sufficient conditions for its effect's occurrence are timelessly present. But in the case under discussion, the effect (the universe) is not timelessly present, and yet must have a timeless cause, since time is part of the effect. Therefore, the cause of the universe cannot be mechanistic or automatic; it must be non-mechanistic. It must be an entity with the capacity of choosing to create the universe as a finite, temporal effect. And the ability to choose is an inherently mental act. Therefore, the entity responsible for creating the universe must be a mind, a personal agent with free will. As William Lane Craig puts it in The Kalām Cosmological Argument, "For while a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions would either produce the effect from eternity or not at all, a personal being may freely choose to create at any time wholly apart from any distinguishing conditions of one moment from another. For it is the very function of will to distinguish like from like."
So it seems that cosmological arguments based on Big Bang cosmology prove, among other things, that the cause of the universe is an incredibly powerful Mind. This obviously matches up with the Judeo-Christian concept of God. One could still object that the Judeo-Christian God has other traits that these cosmological arguments don't prove, but I'm afraid I'm too overawed by what they do prove to think this objection amounts to much.
(cross-posted at Quodlibeta)
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
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16 comments:
Let me begin by saying that, of all the arguments for the existence of any god, the "first cause" is in my top two "closest-to-being-persuasive". (The other is fine-tuning.)
Also, I agree with you that it's beside the point to object to this on the basis that it doesn't get you all the way to a particular type of god-belief, such as Christianity. If it works as part of a cumulative argument, then it is worthwhile.
I guess what ultimately torpedoes this explanation for me is that it seems to require a double-standard. It suggests that any first cause could not be mechanistic, because mechanistic things don't seem to be able to act out of timelessness. But it could be mind. What evidence do we have that mind can act out of timelessness into time?
I sure don't have such a mind. I haven't observed any mind acting in such a way.
In fact, to be blunt, I have yet to see a convincing argument that the mind is a different kind of thing from other occupants of the physical universe - at least in terms of the sort of effects it is capable of producing. Yes, it has certain properties which are intriguing, and as-yet unexplained in purely mechanistic terms. But then, so do electrons. And rocks. And my infernal MacBook. And I have seen loads of evidence filtering out of neuroscience and psychology that suggest that our minds, as we subjectively experience them, are primarily physical, mechanistic entities.
Show me evidence that the mind is causally special in a relevant way, and I will begin to give more weight to the argument that the universe had to be caused by one, as opposed to simply happening, or being caused by something else.
Jim the problem with your argument as I said assumes that the universe has a begining and is not a naturally occuring phenomena. What scant evidence we have been able to collect has been seen only form the perspective of our world, and with a few minor execeptions, still wholly contained within the gravataional sphere of our solar system. We literally have NO perspective on the universe.
Some cosmologists are now theorising that high eneregy membranse colliding are what cause the big bang event. So you would have to change your argument to something created the energy which after a certian time, and so on and so forth.
You are also now making the argument that you are not specifing any ONE god - just a deity of some sort or another. If that is true, which I seriously doubt, then why are you so invested in making us belive there is a god?
After all if you belive in an unknowable creator and not one of the thousands of knowable deities worshiped by man at one point or another, then an atheist is exactly what you want of people.
Because if you ever do find proof of a god they are the only ones who egos are not going to get in the way of them looking past their preconcived notions of what god is or should be.
Also, matter is just a high concentrated form of energy, and given the effects gravitation mass seems to have on space/time many scientist thorize that space/time might exist independenly of matter and energy
"In fact, to be blunt, I have yet to see a convincing argument that the mind is a different kind of thing from other occupants of the physical universe - at least in terms of the sort of effects it is capable of producing."
To be blunt, if you will not see, then you will not see. You are *demanding* to be forced to see what you will not see.
Minds are non-mechanistic. All that "nature" has, and can ever have, at its disposal as causal explanations is mechanism, mechanical cause-and-effect.
"And I have seen loads of evidence filtering out of neuroscience and psychology that suggest that our minds, as we subjectively experience them, are primarily physical, mechanistic entities."
You've seen nothing of the sort.
You've seen fools asserting "I do not exist!"
Regardless of the Big Bang, regardless of whether "the universe," and thus time itself, has a beginning, the fact that there *are* minds in the world seems to me to be the killer argument that God is.
For, if God is not, then the reality of the existence of minds in the world can be "explained" only by reference to mechanism -- but such an "explanation" is simply the denial that minds are real.
Thanks for the comments folks. I'll try to see if I can respond within the confines of a single comment.
Timothy: As always, you open up several cans of worms. First, the argument is that a timeless mechanistic cause could only produce a timeless effect. Since we have a timeless cause and a temporal effect, the cause must be non-mechanistic. This is a negative definition of mindfulness or intent. So it's not a question of mind acting timelessly, it's the more basic question of being able to act intentionally or mindfully.
Second, observing is not the only way to know or discover something. I've never observed other minds than my own, but it would be irrational (actually, it would be crazy) to seriously doubt it.
Third, I think there are several aspects of mind that are discontinuous with the physical universe. I'll just list a few: intent, normativity, qualia, content, rationality. Physical objects and processes do not have these characteristics, but minds do. So I think they suffice as reason to think our minds are not mere congregations of matter.
lujlp: Thanks for coming over and commenting. Everything I've read on Big Bang cosmology claims that the universe began with the Big Bang -- in fact, the cosmologists state this pretty forcefully, saying that it's one of the most proven facts of science. You're right that there are a few who resurrect the old oscillation models, but they're pretty speculative and usually only push the problem back a step.
Saying that our knowledge is limited would also apply to other scientific theories. Human beings have only been around for an eyeblink, but we're able to discover all kinds of things about the earth's history, about how we evolved, etc. The fact that our perspective is limited doesn't call these things into question.
I don't follow your other objection. The argument I presented proves (allegedly) that there is an immaterial, transcendent, omnipresent mind that brought the universe into existence. By itself this is consistent with several religions. To focus on Christianity I would supplement this argument with specifically Christian arguments. I don't see why that would be a problem.
I'll try to respond to Ilíon's comments later.
I'm not sure that it's impossible for a timeless mechanistic cause to be responsible for a temporal effect. In particular, I think your argument requires a determinism in physical things that is known to be violated by quantum mechanics.
But, as there is very little about timelessness that I am sure of (it being a state that is beyond the range at which I can trust my basic intuitions), let me accept that premise for the sake of argument. A mechanistic entity could not have served as a timeless "first cause" for the physical, temporal universe as we know it.
It remains to be shown that any mind is not a mechanistic entity.
It seems to me that, out of the items you mention, at least intent, content, and rationality can already be reproduced mechanistically in computers and robots. (Intent by giving a robot or computer a goal and seeing it pursue that goal. Content and rationality by having it acquire, manipulate, and apply information about the physical world.)
Qualia are a bizarre concept I'd be happy to be educated on - is there a non-circular way of deriving a proof of non-materialism from the fact of subjective sensations?
Normativity is another minefield. The most satisfactory account I have come across of normativity (the ethical theory of desirism) places it squarely in the physical realm.
So I'm back where I started, having no good reason to depart from my naturalistic starting point, and so remaining unpersuaded by the first-cause argument for an all-powerful mind. What do you think?
"... I think your argument requires a determinism in physical things that is known to be violated by quantum mechanics."
Known? Do you mean that strange interpretation which says, in essence, "A = !A." Reason alone should tell you that it's false.
But, if you won't settle for reason, it seems that science (cf lasers) also disputes it
"But, as there is very little about timelessness that I am sure of (it being a state that is beyond the range at which I can trust my basic intuitions), let me accept that premise for the sake of argument. A mechanistic entity could not have served as a timeless "first cause" for the physical, temporal universe as we know it."
Indeed, on all counts.
"It remains to be shown that any mind is not a mechanistic entity."
Actually, no. You have things exactly ass-backwards -- it remains to be shown that any mechanistic entity is a mind.
But, it will never be shown (for it is impossible to show what is false), which doubtless explains why so many seek to shift the burden of proof.
Well, even if you think our minds are deterministic, the argument purports to show that a deterministic timeless cause could not produce a temporal effect. Therefore, the cause of the universe is not deterministic, but must be something with the capacity to actualize one state of affairs or not. Even if our minds do not have this capacity, the point is that the cause of the universe does.
Obviously, I think the attempt to reduce mind to deterministic principles fails. Computers, for example, do not have intentionality or content, since physical objects are not about other physical objects -- a tree is not about a rock, it just "is". You're right that normativity is a mare's nest, but the attempts to do away with it in the realm of morality do not work when you try to do away with them in knowledge. There are epistemic norms, and these cannot be discarded or dismissed without removing knowledge as well. Similarly for rationality; this is why determinism is self-defeating. And qualia are the most basic aspects of our experience. Pretty much everything else is based upon them. If a worldview can't make sense of them, then it fails before it even gets started. It would be like a historical theory which made sense of the Fall of Rome and the Carolingian Renaissance but denied that the United States of America exists.
"... There are epistemic norms, and these cannot be discarded or dismissed without removing knowledge as well. Similarly for rationality; this is why determinism is self-defeating."
To be useful, a theory (of whatever subject-matter) does not necessarily have to account for all truths within its purview; though, obviously, it’s more useful if it can, and more likely to be correct or true. However, a theory which denies truths within its purview cannot be true or correct, nor even useful.
"Actually, no. You have things exactly ass-backwards -- it remains to be shown that any mechanistic entity is a mind."
Ilíon, I honestly think we're both right here. No knock-down argument has been put forward for the assertion that minds are non-mechanistic entities; no knock-down argument has been put forward that they aren't. So we're left disagreeing over the weight of evidence on either sides, but with (apparently) no compelling arguments to tip the scale either way.
Jim, I agree with you: it is important to, at some level in one's philosophy, have an account of qualia. Perhaps it would be helpful to set aside the larger question and just address this one: what is the non-materialist explanation of qualia, and how is it better than a materialist explanation?
There are explanations of qualia that, I think, make sense of them from a physical perspective. The Wikipedia article on qualia, for example, points to multiple arguments on both sides.
(I should probably reiterate my occasional caveat: I am not a trained philosopher, though I think many of these questions are interesting and even important. So I am very much aware of my shortcomings in this area. I am also aware that professional philosophers, when surveyed, often agree with me on matters of god-belief, naturalism, free will, and so forth. So I feel confident that there are respectable arguments for the positions I hold, even when I do not know the details of those arguments.)t
"... I think your argument requires a determinism in physical things that is known to be violated by quantum mechanics."
Known? Do you mean that strange interpretation which says, in essence, "A = !A." Reason alone should tell you that it's false.
No, that is not what I mean. I mean that quantum particles exhibit behaviours that are not entirely deterministic. There seems to be a random element.
In Jim's original post, he says this:
A timeless mechanistic cause would produce its effect timelessly, since the necessary and sufficient conditions for its effect's occurrence are timelessly present.
What I'm saying is that this only works for a completely predetermined physical universe. If randomness (which is distinct from conscious choice) could be an element in the first cause, then this particular argument of Jim's loses much of its force. Necessity and sufficiency become much murkier in the presence of stochastic (randomness-incorporating) processes. Because we seem to see stochastic material causes, it is fair to say that randomness could be part of a material first cause.
The link you provided suggests that the apparent randomness in the quantum world is an illusion. I think this suggestion has been present for most of the history of quantum physical theorizing. I do not see that it has been shown that there is, in fact no randomness in physical systems, but that may be beside the point. The mere possibility that physical systems could incorporate some inherently random behaviours robs Jim's argument of its deductive validity.
Even if it is true that (in Jim's words) the effect (the universe) is not timelessly present, and yet must have a timeless cause, since time is part of the effect, we have at least two possible explanations. One is Jim's - that a non-mechanistic cause capable of non-pre-determined choice exercised that choice, at some non-infinitely-distant past moment, to cause the universe to exist. The other is that a mechanistic (ie, entirely material) but stochastic (ie, at least partly random) process happened, at some non-infinitely-distant past moment, to cause the universe to exist.
Perhaps the latter will be less emotionally or aesthetically satisfying to you. But logically, it seems to address Jim's problem as successfully as the former.
"No, that is not what I mean. I mean that quantum particles exhibit behaviours that are not entirely deterministic. There seems to be a random element."
Ah! So you mean: "We don't know or understand what caused/causes 'X' -- therefore we are justified in saying that 'X' occurs *without* cause -- Ergo, God is not!"
To assert randomness as a cause to to assert causelessness as a cause.
"Perhaps the latter will be less emotionally or aesthetically satisfying to you. But logically, it seems to address Jim's problem as successfully as the former."
Do you want to know what I think of superciliousness and 'Bulverism'?
Looking back, I see that I overstated one claim. When I said that determinism "is known to be violated by quantum mechanics", I should instead have said it "seems to be violated by quantum mechanics". I apologize for the exaggeration.
Ah! So you mean: "We don't know or understand what caused/causes 'X' -- therefore we are justified in saying that 'X' occurs *without* cause -- Ergo, God is not!"
No. Jim's argument was that a mind is the only possible way for the universe to begin to exist. I presented a logical alternative - a stochastic mechanistic process. We have some evidence (quantum mechanics) that stochastic processes (ie, processes that exhibit structured but partially random behaviour) exist in nature. So my claim is that God is not the only logically possible answer to the question "What caused the universe?" I do not mean to suggest more than this. Although I doubt the existence of any god, I do not assert the non-existence of gods as a certainty.
To assert randomness as a cause to to assert causelessness as a cause.
Maybe. But to suggest that some things behave in a constrained-but-partially-random way is not. You are entitled to reject out-of-hand the possibility that some events have a random element in them. But then you are leaving the realm of reasoned investigation, and entering the realm of dogma.
"Perhaps the latter will be less emotionally or aesthetically satisfying to you. But logically, it seems to address Jim's problem as successfully as the former."
Do you want to know what I think of superciliousness and 'Bulverism'?
What can I say? You don't like my answer, I don't like your answer. Rhetorical posturing aside, I don't think either of us has a knock-down deductive proof for our position. It is not supercilious to point that out.
As for Bulverism ... I think that's an unfair accusation, but please feel free to elaborate if you think I'm arguing in a circle. I have tried above to clarify a couple of points that might have led you to this conclusion.
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