tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6672880129970799148.post6184034319837877258..comments2023-08-22T07:01:08.590-07:00Comments on Agent Intellect: Quote of the DayJim S.http://www.blogger.com/profile/15538540873375357030noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6672880129970799148.post-54516099407595246022011-07-31T11:53:36.010-07:002011-07-31T11:53:36.010-07:00Jim: I share your criticism on the "differin...Jim: I share your criticism on the "differing value of payout" point. As you observed, the size of payouts matter crucially in determining the best decision, both the subject's valuation of them and relative to each other. Since a given currency value<br />will be valued differently by different subjects, it's tough to generalize this. Many real- and thought experiments suffer this problem. Newcomb's Box is one. What we need is to estimate the direct utility to the subjects and once that's normalized, then we can get further with this experiment.<br /><br />A similar problem that decision and game theory-type experiments also suffer from the one-round<br />effect. Though it doesn't affect this particularly experiment, one of the biggest is that games are distorted badly if the participants know when the last round is. Consequently if participants know there's exactly *one* round, they're going to behave extremely differently from a game with indefinite rounds. This actually explains why people seem more likely to cheat at certain infrequently-performed or one-off economic transactions, because they know it's only one round and there's less reason not to defect. These are really just problems with experimental design in the real world but don't get directly at your deeper point of whether we can know what sort of model decision-makers are using.Michael Catonhttp://thelateenlightenment.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.com