tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6672880129970799148.post7659024977526573839..comments2023-08-22T07:01:08.590-07:00Comments on Agent Intellect: Mind and PhysicalismJim S.http://www.blogger.com/profile/15538540873375357030noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6672880129970799148.post-21076553736896901282010-03-21T14:38:29.039-07:002010-03-21T14:38:29.039-07:00Hi Timothy, thanks for the thoughtful comments. Re...Hi Timothy, thanks for the thoughtful comments. Regarding your first point, defining qualia as subjective experience does not preclude their being given an objective definition unless we assume that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. I do indeed think this is the case, but there are some who disagree. But at any rate, the point is that <i>we have subjective experiences</i>. If the physicalist worldview cannot account for such experiences, then our response should not be to reject the experiences but to reject physicalism. We have more reason, <i>much</i> more reason, to accept the experiences than physicalism.<br /><br />Re: your second point, you write, "How is this even a problem for physicalism? Doesn't physicalism take m and p* to be identical?" Well, no, it doesn't. What you're describing is mind-brain identity, and such theories have been almost completely rejected by philosophers of mind (including those who are physicalists) since the 1960s when Hilary Putnam refuted them with his multiple realization argument. Kim goes over this in chapter three of <i>Philosophy of Mind</i>, so I would just refer you there. This gets into the difference between type physicalism and token physicalism.<br /><br />Re: Davidson's anomalous monism, you write, "So much the worse for the principle(s) of rationality: does Davidson (or anyone else) truly believe that a mind is constrained to only hold internally-consistent sets of beliefs?" Of course he doesn't. What he does believe is that at least <i>some</i> of our beliefs are internally consistent, and this is unaccounted for on (type) phyiscalist presuppositions. As long as <i>any</i> belief we hold is, in some sense, rational, we have to posit a worldview which would allow for this rationality. The claim is that physicalism cannot account for it.<br /><br />Finally, re: Lewis, the claim isn't that our beliefs must be uncaused, but that they must be caused by the right things, namely, the things that would make those beliefs valid, veridical, verisimilitudinous, or whatever you want to call it. Lewis's claim is that those things are reasons. To illustrate: my belief that, if Socrates is a man and all men are mortal then Socrates is mortal must be caused by my recognition of the laws of logic and their application to this case. But the laws of logic <i>are not physical entities</i>. According to physicalism, my belief that Socrates is mortal is brought about by the configuration of the molecules that make up my brain, not the laws of logic. The latter are completely irrelevant to my drawing the conclusion that Socrates is mortal. Evolution has guaranteed that at least <i>some</i> of my beliefs are true (as well as that some are false; check out the Garcia effect), but beliefs that have nothing to do with our survival and propagation would be entirely untouched by evolution. So the point is, if physicalism is true -- if the physical universe is all that exists -- then rationality goes out the window. You have to reject physicalism in order to conclude that any of our beliefs are rational, including belief in physicalism.Jim S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15538540873375357030noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6672880129970799148.post-36037359288222418762010-03-19T10:24:38.913-07:002010-03-19T10:24:38.913-07:00And my final response to the original post:
To be...And my final response to the original post:<br /><br /><b>To be caused is not to be proved. Wishful thinkings, prejudices, and the delusions of madness, are all caused, but they are ungrounded. Indeed to be caused is so different from being proved that we behave in disputation as if they were mutually exclusive. The mere existence of causes for a belief is popularly treated as raising a presumption that it is groundless, and the most popular way of discrediting a person's opinions is to explain them causally -- "You say that because (Cause and Effect) you are a capitalist, or a hypochondriac, or a mere man, or only a woman."</b><br /><br />Yes, this is a common approach. But that doesn't make it valid.<br /><br />Suppose I am presented with an argument that (according to the rules of logic and evidence) entails a particular conclusion. As a consequence of being presented with that argument, I come to believe in the conclusion. My belief in the conclusion is both <i>caused</i> and <i>valid</i>. Being caused does not render it invalid. Nor does being caused render it valid of course - the validity and the causal source of a belief are independent of one another.<br /><br />Perhaps what you and Lewis are saying is that, if our beliefs are physically caused, we must be cautious in accepting them as valid.<br /><br />Yes! A thousand times, yes! We are fallible creatures, and are not inherently constrained in our beliefs by the abstract laws of reason. We must be very careful in adopting and acting on beliefs. We must do what we can to set aside our own biases and shortcomings. Even then, in the knowledge that the process is itself imperfect, we must make our assertions carefully, always willing to retract or adjust them in light of new evidence.<br /><br />(Gosh, that started to get a little preachier than I'd intended. Sorry.)Timothy Millshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00373801153623991221noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6672880129970799148.post-64351317774911461492010-03-19T10:14:56.389-07:002010-03-19T10:14:56.389-07:00Davidson's thesis is that the requirement of r...<b>Davidson's thesis is that the requirement of rationality and coherence is of the essence of the mental -- that is, it is constitutive of the mental in the sense that it is exactly what makes the mental mental.<br /><br />But it is clear that the physical domain is subject to no such requirement; as Davidson says, the principle of rationality and coherence has "no echo" in physical theory.</b><br /><br />So much the worse for the principle(s) of rationality: does Davidson (or anyone else) truly believe that a mind is constrained to only hold internally-consistent sets of beliefs?<br /><br />Perhaps this is one point where physicalism and non-physicalism make materially different predictions about the nature of the mind. A physicalist account, informed by the biological theory of natural selection, would predict perceptual and cognitive systems that are not rationally coherent, but which are simply adaptively adequate. This seems to fit with the observable nature of human mind quite well.Timothy Millshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00373801153623991221noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6672880129970799148.post-62385415791933881032010-03-19T09:56:37.678-07:002010-03-19T09:56:37.678-07:00But to acknowledge that p has also a physical caus...<b>But to acknowledge that <i>p</i> has also a physical cause, <i>p*</i>, at <i>t</i> is to invite the question: Given that <i>p</i> has a physical cause <i>p*</i>, what causal work is left for <i>m</i> to contribute? The physical cause therefore threatens to exclude, and preempt, the mental cause. This is the problem of causal exclusion.</b><br /><br />How is this even a problem for physicalism? Doesn't physicalism take <i>m</i> and <i>p*</i> to be identical? That is the approach that I take to be most persuasive, and under which I call myself a physicalist. And under that approach, causal exclusion is not an issue: the physical cause is the same as the mental cause.<br /><br />In fact, isn't causal exclusion one of the big problems for dualism? What alternative is Kim suggesting we accept as an alternative to physicalism? (Please note that I ask these questions in humility as a layman, without trying to imply that they are unanswerable.)Timothy Millshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00373801153623991221noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6672880129970799148.post-43675434162689118782010-03-19T09:47:19.934-07:002010-03-19T09:47:19.934-07:00I would like to respond to every point you raise, ...I would like to respond to every point you raise, but given my long-windedness, I'll start with just the first.<br /><br /><b>The qualia is the pain, the "this hurts" experience. The difficulty in explaining qualia as physical properties is notorious, so much so that some philosophers feel it necessary to deny their existence (I guess the thinking is, if your philosophy conflicts with reality, the problem must be in the latter). The problem of qualia really opens the floodgates to the problems of explaining consciousness in general in terms of physical phenomena and processes.</b><br /><br />If you define qualia as entirely an aspect of <i>subjective</i> experience, then you have <i>a priori</i> excluded the possibility of an objective definition being able to capture them.<br /><br />It therefore says nothing about the validity of a physical account of mind to say that it cannot easily describe qualia. I am curious - how much better do non-physical accounts of mind do on this regard? Can you give examples?Timothy Millshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00373801153623991221noreply@blogger.com